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EVERYONE WANTS TO SEE  
THE ENTIRE HISTORY OF YOU* 
 
Caesar Kalinowski IV** 
 






Starting with heavy, immobile cameras and progressing 
to immediately shareable, discreet cellphone videos, the last 
century has expanded our ability to record ourselves and 
others—whenever and wherever—to formerly unfathomable 
heights. Black Mirror, a technology-based, sci-fi miniseries 
now produced by digital entertainment giant, Netflix, tracks 
this trajectory to its logical end in “The Entire History of 
You.” In this not-so-distant, sci-fi future where Google Glass 
is replaced by an “Augmented Reality Contact Lens and 
Grain,” everything we see and hear is immediately recorded 
and uploaded. Effectively, we no longer need memories to 
recall the past. 
But as with all new technologies, and indeed all Black 
Mirror episodes, the Grain technology reveals an inherent 
flaw in humans: when everything is recorded, humans 
cannot relax in the comfort of hazy recollection or secret 
memories. In the context of the legal system, both 
government prosecutors and adverse civil parties will seek 
discovery of everything one has seen and heard. This article 
examines the constitutional and privacy issues raised by 
Grain technology, which will undoubtedly be here soon. 
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“You know, half the organic memories you have are junk.”1 
Black Mirror, which has been labeled “TV’s Magic 8-Ball”2 
for its technological prescience, is a collection of self-contained 
episodes that tackle plausible technological advances and the effect 
those advances have on our world. While many episodes take place 
in the United Kingdom, this article assumes that similar technology 
exists contemporaneously in the United States and analyze various 
episodes with an eye towards U.S. law. 
In the show’s third episode, “The Entire History of You,”3 
people in this alternate universe have almost uniformly been 
implanted with a digital recording device known as a “grain”, which 
allows them to review video and audio playback of every moment 
they experience.4 Using a handheld remote, memories are shuffled 
through like episodes on Netflix; they can be encrypted, deleted, or 
                                                                                                             
1      Black Mirror: The Entire History of You (Channel 4 television broadcast 
Dec. 18, 2011). 
2 G. Clay Whittaker, ‘Black Mirror’ Is TV’s Magic 8-Ball, THE DAILY 
BEAST (Sept. 14, 2015 1:05 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/black-mirror-is-
tvs-magic-8-ball (“It becomes difficult to discuss the impact and predictions of 
dystopian programs a few years after they’re created. At some point the 
conversation has to switch from ‘will they be right’ to ‘are they right.’ In many 
aspects Black Mirror was early in capturing certain aspects of life that have 
become familiar to us since.”). 
3 Black Mirror: The Entire History of You (Channel 4 television broadcast 
Dec. 18, 2011).  
4 The files are referred to as “grain recordings.” 
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displayed on TV screens. Grains can also be stolen (a process known 
as “gouging”), with the stored memories then sold to voyeuristic 
“millionaire Chinese pervs.” Because the memory recordings in the 
gouged grain would be lost, new buyers are given 30 years’ worth 
of backup space to store memories (in the “cloud”). 
Initially, we are introduced to Liam Foxwell, a young lawyer 
interviewing with a law firm. On his way to the airport, Liam 
reviews his recent interview performance through real time video 
footage displayed on a retinal screen and stored in an implanted 
“grain” behind his ear.5 At the airport, Liam consents to have his 
memories screened by security agents to review the people Liam 
came into contact with over the last 72 hours.6 Once home, Liam 
uses his grain during arguments with his wife to settle disputes, 
scrutinize body language, and uncover an affair.7 
 Given this ability to definitively resolve any dispute as to 
who said what, what someone knew, or where someone was at any 
given time, the implications of such technology are clear. Police, 
insurance agencies, and aggrieved parties would assuredly seek 
discovery of pertinent recordings, leading to issues regarding 
privacy, government searches or seizures of an individual’s grain, 
self-incrimination, and the production of evidence. Due in part to 
the similarity between the grain’s functions and already-ubiquitous 
cell phone technology, existing law is likely sufficient to address the 
attendant constitutional and privacy rights of U.S. citizens with 
grains.  
 
I. INVASION OF PRIVACY 
 
The first major issue implicated by grains is the right to 
privacy. In this world where almost everyone is automatically 
recording everything they do and see, anyone a person interacts with 
(or views) is also being recorded by default. Harmlessly walking 
down the street? Recorded on a grain. Checking into a hotel room 
for an adulterous tryst? Recorded on a grain. Going on a drunken 
rant? Recorded on a grain. Every moment that someone else is 
                                                                                                             
5      Id. 
6   Id. 
7  Id. 
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present, they are recording you and that memory is accessible, 
reproducible, and displayable for anyone to see.  
Unlike in the European Union, the “‘right to be forgotten,’ . 
. . is not recognized in the United States.”8 Under federal law, 
“[a]bsent some special circumstance (such as an attorney-client 
privilege), no right of privacy or other protection attaches to words 
spoken by one individual to another individual; the speaker assumes 
the risk that his auditor may repeat the conversation to others.”9 
Unfortunately for secretive individuals, there are no federal laws 
that prohibit a second party from recording them as they go about 
their business.  
Looking to the future, the federal government is highly 
unlikely to create any such laws. The right to record video or audio, 
at least “in traditional public fora—streets, sidewalks, plazas, and 
parks—is . . . necessarily included within the First Amendment’s 
guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of the right to 
disseminate the resulting recording.”10 Any attempt by the 
government to establish content or non-content related restrictions 
on recording, would be subject to either strict scrutiny11 or 
intermediate scrutiny,12 respectively. 
State law, however, often does provide a more robust right 
to privacy. Several state constitutions explicitly create such a right.13 
                                                                                                             
8 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Case 
C–131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD), ECLI:EU:C:2014:616 (May 13, 2014)). 
9 United States v. Cox, 836 F. Supp. 1189, 1197 (D. Md. 1993). 
10 Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 594–95 (7th 
Cir. 2012). 
11 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) 
(“Laws that burden political speech are ‘subject to strict scrutiny,’ which requires 
the Government to prove that the restriction ‘furthers a compelling interest and is 
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’”) (quoting Wisconsin Right to Life, 
Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)). 
12 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (for non-content 
restrictions on speech, the government must show a sufficiently important or 
substantial interest that is unrelated to suppression of free expression).  
13 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to privacy 
is recognized and shall not be infringed. The legislature shall implement this 
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The Restatement (Second) of Torts also concludes that “[o]ne who 
invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the 
resulting harm to the interests of the other.”14 Three of the four 
causes of action most commonly recognized by the Restatement 
would very likely apply to grain recordings: (1) unreasonable 
intrusion upon the seclusion of another;15 (2) unreasonable publicity 
given to the other’s private life;16 and (3) publicity that unreasonably 
places the other in a false light before the public.17 Subject to the 
vagaries of state law, any post-recording publication of personal, 
offensive, or misleading recordings could subject the recorder to 
additional state law liability. 
 
II. SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND ARRESTS 
 
The next issue arises in the contexts of grain searches and 
                                                                                                             
section.”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent 
and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and 
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and 
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“Every 
natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion 
into the person’s private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section 
shall not be construed to limit the public’s right of access to public records and 
meetings as provided by law.”); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“No person shall be 
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”). 
14      RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
15   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977) 
(“One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or 
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the 
other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person.”). 
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977) 
(“One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is 
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized 
is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is 
not of legitimate concern to the public.”). 
17 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“One 
who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the 
public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, 
if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless 
disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the 
other would be placed.”). 
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seizures. Given the vast amount of information potentially captured 
by a grain, the government would surely seek control over grain 
recordings in criminal prosecutions. If guilt or innocence could be 
easily determined by viewing the alleged event unfold in real time, 
gathering any other evidence would be unnecessary. The Fourth 
Amendment, however, would still likely provide adequate 
protections for a person’s grain rights. 
The Fourth Amendment provides that the “right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated…”18 Thus, when “the Government obtains information by 
physically intruding” on persons, houses, papers, or effects, “a 
‘search’ within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment” has 
occurred.19 “The Fourth Amendment is not concerned only with 
trespassory intrusions on property[,]” but also “when the 
government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society 
recognizes as reasonable.”20  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has created a two-part 
inquiry to examine if the government needs a search warrant before 
searching or seizing a citizen’s property (here, a grain).21 First, the 
individual must have “manifested a subjective expectation of 
privacy in the object of the challenged search.”22 Second, society 
must “[be] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.”23 
While the subjective inquiry is case specific, it is easy to deduce that 
a person with a grain stored in his or her body, which contains every 
conceivable piece of private data, would subjectively expect their 
grain’s contents to be private. In regard to the objective inquiry, it 
can be assumed that by virtue of an individual’s internal possession 
and control over their own grain and historical privacy of one’s own 
                                                                                                             
18    U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
19 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407 n.3 (2012). 
20 Id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001)). 
21 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (citing Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
22    California, 476 U.S. at 211. 
23 Id. (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 347). 
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thoughts,24 society recognizes that person’s privacy expectation as 
reasonable.25 In short, because of the internal placement of the grain 
and the collective magnitude of the information stored on that grain, 
the Fourth Amendment would require a search warrant for the 
search or seizure of a grain absent exceptional circumstances. 
While many exceptions, such as “exigent circumstances,”26 
are highly fact intensive and cannot be addressed in the abstract, the 
search incident to arrest (“SITA”) exception can be decided as a 
matter of law. The Supreme Court “endorsed a general rule that 
arresting officers, in order to prevent the arrestee from obtaining a 
weapon or destroying evidence, could search both ‘the person 
arrested’ and ‘the area within his immediate control.’”27 Later,, the 
Court analyzed the SITA exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement in the context of cellular phones. 28 The Court 
held that the exception did not apply because it found that cell 
phones “implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by 
the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse” in that they 
contain “a digital record of nearly every aspect of [peoples’] lives—
from the mundane to the intimate.”29 Although the Court noted the 
possibility of data being remotely wiped to destroy any evidence, it 
found that such tampering was not prevalent and the government 
                                                                                                             
24 See generally Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). 
25 The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that physical invasions of 
the body by the state implicate privacy and liberty rights. See Cruzan by Cruzan 
v. Dir. Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 342 (1990) (“The sanctity, and 
individual privacy, of the human body is obviously fundamental to liberty. ‘Every 
violation of a person’s bodily integrity is an invasion of his or her liberty.’”) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 237 
(1990)).  
26 See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) (“A variety of 
circumstances may give rise to an exigency sufficient to justify a warrantless 
search, including law enforcement’s need to provide emergency assistance to an 
occupant of a home, engage in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect, or enter a burning 
building to put out a fire and investigate its cause.”) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted).  
27 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2175 (2016) (quoting 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 763) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
28 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
29 Id. at 2490 (citing Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010)). 
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had more targeted ways to address that concern.30 
Looking at grain technology, the Court would likely find 
Riley instructive. Like cell phones, grains store an immense treasure 
trove of personal and intimate information. Also, like cell phones, 
information on grains cannot be used as a weapon that would 
threaten an arresting officer’s life.31 While “The Entire History of 
You,” did not address the possibility of remote wiping, we might 
assume that other technological advances will allow police to take 
control of a person’s grain remote, block incoming signals, or make 
a copy of the data to preserve evidence. Simply put, grains, “[w]ith 
all they contain and all they may reveal, [would] hold for many 
Americans ‘the privacies of life.’”32 As such, whether incident to 
arrest or as part of an investigation, the Fourth amendment would 
likely protect grain recordings from search and seizure.  
An important caveat is that like Liam’s interaction with the 
airport security agent, an individual could consent to have his or her 
grain recordings reviewed.33 Assuming that consent is not the result 
of government coercion or police gamesmanship, it would waive 
any Fourth Amendment or Fifth Amendment self-incrimination 
claims by a defendant.34 
 
III. COMPELLING PRODUCTION BY DEFENDANT  
 
 Once a person is arrested and a search warrant is obtained, 
the next question is whether the police could force the person to turn 
over his or her grain recordings. The Self-Incrimination Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment provides that no “person . . . shall be 
                                                                                                             
30 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486–87. 
31 Id. at 2485 (“Digital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as 
a weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s escape.”). 
32 Id. at 2494–95 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 
(1886)). Although this quote speaks about cell phones, the same could apply to 
grains. 
33 See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (holding that “[t]he Fourth 
Amendment test for a valid consent to search is that the consent be voluntary”). 
34 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 221 (1973). 
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compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”35 
This “privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to 
testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence 
of a testimonial or communicative nature.”36 To be considered 
“testimonial,” the information sought itself must explicitly or 
implicitly relate to “a factual assertion or disclose information” to 
be considered “compelled” testimony.37 The Fifth Amendment’s 
right against self-incrimination ultimately “respects a private inner 
sanctum of individual feeling and thought and proscribes state 
intrusion to extract self-condemnation.”38 
 Less clear, however, is the status of the law with regard to 
production of physical items that tend to incriminate a person. The 
Supreme Court held that “a compulsory production of the private 
books and papers of the owner . . . is compelling him to be a witness 
against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment[.]”39 
But the Supreme Court has also “long held that the privilege does 
not protect a suspect from being compelled by the State to produce 
‘real or physical evidence.’”40 The distinction, it seems, turns on 
whether the personal effects (or body part) are testimonial in nature, 
or whether the defendant was compelled by the state to create the 
material.41  
The Court in Fisher v. United States, however, held that “the 
Fifth Amendment would not be violated by the [compelled 
production of] papers [which] on their face might incriminate the 
[defendant].”42 The Court recognized that the act of producing the 
documents may be testimonial to the extent that the act of production 
concedes “the existence of the papers demanded and their 
                                                                                                             
35 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
36 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966). 
37 Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988). 
38 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973). 
39 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886). 
40 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (1990) (quoting Schmerber, 
384 U.S. at 764). 
41 See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 472–73 (1976) (upholding the 
introduction of seized business papers because “[t]he records seized contained 
statements that petitioner had voluntarily committed to writing”). 
42    Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976). 
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possession or control by the taxpayer,” or because the production 
serves to authenticate the materials.43 Accordingly, multiple courts 
of appeals’ physical evidence self-incrimination analysis now 
focuses on whether demanding the information compels its creation 
and, if not, “whether the act of producing it would constitute 
compelled testimonial communication.”44  
Here, a grain is definitely in possession of the defendant, 
located within his or her body, and contains recordings of what the 
defendant said and observed. Although the recording, and any 
statements made in the recordings, would be considered voluntary 
(at the time of their creation), the production of those recordings 
would not be voluntary. In the most literal sense, a defendant 
compelled to produce the grain recordings of what they said would 
be forced “‘to disclose the contents of his own mind’ that implicates 
the Self–Incrimination Clause.”45 
 A much closer call occurs in the context of arguably non-
testimonial grain recordings, such as video of a crime scene or the 
dimensions of an instrument. Like producing a shirt for the jury’s 
consideration,46 the “evidence” contained in the grain’s videos could 
be viewed as real or physical evidence. In those cases, the Court 
would still find that the defendant is not required to produce his or 
her grain recordings because it would constitute compelling of 
personal testimony (in the form of what was seen). It also does not 
fall neatly into the categorical exception for real or physical 
evidence47 because it directly implicates the defendant’s control or 
knowledge of evidence. In that way, it is so connected with the 
defendant’s personal thoughts and actions as to implicate the self-
                                                                                                             
43 Id. at 409–10.  
44 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 
87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984); 
Andresen, 427 U.S. at 473; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409–10). 
45 Doe, 487 U.S. at 211 (quoting Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 
(1957)). 
46 See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252–53 (1910) (compelling 
production of a shirt). 
47    See, e.g., Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409. 
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incrimination concerns inherent in the Fifth Amendment’s 
protection. 
 
IV. COMPELLING PRODUCTION BY A THIRD PARTY  
 
But what about compelling the production of third parties’ 
grain recordings? Could the police force a witness to a crime to turn 
over their internal video feed? The answer is very likely, yes.48 The 
Supreme Court has made clear “that the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination, being personal to the 
defendant, does not extend to the testimony or statements of third 
parties called as witnesses at trial.”49 Police informants or 
undercover agents will likely have no problem producing their grain 
recordings, even those containing the surreptitiously-recorded 
admissions of a defendant, without violating the Fourth or Fifth 
Amendment.50 
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c)(1), the state 
may use a subpoena to “order the witness to produce any books, 
papers, documents, data, or other objects the subpoena designates.” 
51 In order for a witness to quash such a subpoena, they would have 
to show:  
(1) that the documents are evidentiary and 
relevant; (2) that they are not otherwise procurable 
reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due 
diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly prepare 
for trial without such production and inspection in 
advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such 
inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the trial; 
                                                                                                             
48   Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973) (“The Constitution 
explicitly prohibits compelling an accused to bear witness ‘against himself’: it 
necessarily does not proscribe incriminating statements elicited from another.”). 
49 United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 234 (1975). 
50 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971); Hoffa v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (“[T]his Court nor any member has ever 
expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s misplaced 
belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not 
reveal it.”). 
51 Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(1). 
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and (4) that the application is made in good faith and 
is not intended as a general ‘fishing expedition.’52  
Absent such a showing, a third-party witness’s grain 
recordings would have to be turned over to the state upon 
subpoena.53 
Although not specifically addressed in this Black Mirror 
episode, it is foreseeable that a grain might both store recordings 
locally and back up those recordings online in the cloud. If the 
recordings are stored on a remote server, the state would still be able 
to  access to them through the Stored Communications Act.54 Under 
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c), the state could obtain any content or non-
content information contained within a server by obtaining a search 
warrant.55 Absent a privilege or a failure to comply with applicable 
                                                                                                             
52 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699–700 (1974). 
53 Other statutes also provide an avenue for disclosure in certain types of 
criminal investigation. Under 21 U.S.C. § 876(a) (date of code edition cited), for 
example, the Attorney General has the authority to “require the production of any 
records (including books, papers, documents, and other tangible things which 
constitute or contain evidence) which the Attorney General finds relevant or 
material to the investigation” of a violation of the Controlled Substances Act. 
54 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (date of code edition cited) (“Records concerning 
electronic communication service or remote computing service.--(1) A 
governmental entity may require a provider of electronic communication service 
or remote computing service to disclose a record or other information pertaining 
to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of 
communications) only when the governmental entity— 
(A) obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued 
using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction; 
(B) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this 
section; 
(C) has the consent of the subscriber or customer to such disclosure; 
(D) submits a formal written request relevant to a law enforcement 
investigation concerning telemarketing fraud for the name, address, and place 
of business of a subscriber or customer of such provider, which subscriber or 
customer is engaged in telemarketing (as such term is defined in section 2325 
of this title); or 
(E) seeks information under paragraph (2).”). 
55 Under 18 U.S.C. 2510(8), “‘contents’, when used with respect to any wire, 
oral, or electronic communication, includes any information concerning the 
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law, the government would very likely be able to compel third 
parties—whether witnesses to the crime or holders of the 
information—to produce copies of grain recordings. 
 
V. COMPELLING PRODUCTION BY THE GOVERNMENT 
 
 Analogous to police body cams, defendants would also prize 
access to the arresting officers’ grain recordings in order to establish 
malfeasance or refute the government’s theory of the case. But how 
much of the grain footage should be produced? Do the officers’ have 
an individual right to privacy that could protect certain recordings? 
While state laws vary on the subject, federal officers’ grain 
recordings would likely be obtainable with few exemptions. 
 Like tort claims for invasion of privacy, state statutes 
provide the most likely basis for requesting grain productions. As 
such, the states are relatively unburdened when it comes to 
legislating who can and cannot have access to police recordings.56 
While many states have public records request statutes,57 some 
states specifically exempt body camera videos from disclosure 
under certain statutes58 or limit requests to certain individuals.59 
Generally speaking, these exemptions from disclosure are not 
complete bars, but instead ban production of videos taken within 
traditionally private areas such as private residences, mental health 
facilities, or other places where citizens have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.60 With few exceptions, the person being 
recorded by a body camera is authorized to obtain those 
                                                                                                             
substance, purport, or meaning of that communication[.]” 
56 Adam Marshall, Police Bodycam Videos: The Wild West of Open 
Records Requests, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Feb. 21, 
2018), https://www.rcfp.org/bodycam-video-access. 
57 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6250 et seq. (1998); WASH. REV. CODE 
42.56.010 et seq (2017). 
58 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-240(G)(1) (2015) (“Data recorded by a 
body-worn camera is not a public record subject to disclosure under the Freedom 
of Information Act.”). 
59 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-240(G)(5) (2015) (listing individuals “who 
may request and must receive data recorded by a body-worn camera”).  
60 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 119.071(l)(2) (2018). 
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 Under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),62 citizens 
may request the full or partial disclosure of previously unreleased 
information and documents controlled by the United States 
government. Like body cameras, federal employees’ grain 
recordings would be subject to release under this statute as a 
document controlled by the government. Section 552(b)(7) of the 
FOIA outlines certain exemptions for disclosures, including 
material that “could reasonably be expected to constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” which weighs “the 
privacy interests that would be compromised by disclosure against 
the public interest in release of the requested information.”63 So, 
although individuals are authorized to request all documents or 
videos pertaining to them,64 other individuals’ privacy rights―even 
those of federal law enforcement officers―may be invoked to 
defeat a records request.65  
 Ultimately, the current law regarding government 
disclosures of information is sufficiently broad―and the grain 
technology is sufficiently similar to body cameras―that little would 
need to be changed with the advent of grain recordings. Individuals 
recorded by police would still have access to those recordings in 
criminal and most civil cases. Any exemptions to grain disclosures 
would likely align with current exemptions, which focus on the 
government’s interest in preventing ongoing crime or protecting 
third parties’ individual privacy rights. 
 
                                                                                                             
61 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 119.071(l)(4)(a) (2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-
240(G)(5)(a) (2015). 
62 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Year of edition of statute).  
63 Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
64 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1) (Year of edition of statute). 
65 See Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1115–16 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (affirming exemption of “names, addresses, telephone numbers, social 
security numbers, and other such private information regarding law enforcement 
officials, a ‘judicial protectee,’ other government employees, unnamed ‘third-
party individuals,’ and [a third party]”). 
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Grain recordings, which would show accurate depictions of 
an individual’s visual and auditory perceptions, would be invaluable 
evidence for private litigants, criminal defendants, and the 
government. As with any technology that makes it easier to attain 
the truth of a matter but implicates a privacy right, grain recordings 
would be very likely protected under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment. Additionally, while production of grain recordings 
would likely be routine in civil matters, criminal defendants would 
still have adequate protections against self-incrimination to limit the 
government’s ability to obtain those recordings.  
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